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RÉSUMÉ 
 
Un contrat contingent dans un jeu à utilité transférable spécifie un résultat pour chaque 
état possible. On suppose que les coalitions évaluent ces contrats en considérant les excès 
minimaux possibles. On s’intéresse à l’existence et à la caractérisation des contrats efficaces. 
On montre que de tels contrats existent si et seulement si l’ensemble des coalitions possibles 
contient un sous-ensemble équilibré. De plus, on propose une caractérisation des valeurs 
conduisant à des contrats efficaces pour le cas des collections équilibrées minimales. 
 
Mots clés : jeux à utilité transférable, incertitude, collections équilibrées 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 A contingent contract in a transferable utility game under uncertainty specifies an 
outcome for each possible state. It is assumed that coalitions evaluate these contracts 
by considering the minimal possible excesses. A main question of the paper concerns 
the existence and characterization of efficient contracts. It is shown that they exist if and 
only if the set of possible coalitions contains a balanced subset. Moreover, a 
characterization of values that result in efficient contracts in the case of minimally 
balanced collections is provided. 
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1 Introduction
Consider a group of players facing a cooperative game-theoretic situation of which the
data are uncertain. To focus on an example, suppose the players are rms that decide
to cooperate, but the demands for the various goods that they produce fluctuate over
time, and so do the prots that each coalition of rms could obtain. In order to keep
cooperation guaranteed the rms could try to design a contract stating the prot shares
of the rms for all contingencies that might arise. For the evaluation of such a contract a
rm can use some criterion for decision making under uncertainty. In the present paper
it will be assumed that rms wish to be on the safe side and evaluate a contract by its
worst case. The central questions that we raise are the following. Can we characterize
the contracts that are ecient with respect to this criterion? Do such contracts always
exist? Is it possible to assign a solution (for example, a prot sharing agreement) to each
certain situation such that this results in contingent contracts under uncertainty that are
ecient?
We will study these questions in the context of transferable utility (TU) games, where
each coalition is characterized by the payo it can obtain by cooperation. In line with the
above example one may think of these payos as representing monetary amounts, such
as prots. A cooperative game under uncertainty is a pair of TU games: one of these
will be the true game. For an associated pair of payo vectors, each coalition calculates
its minimum gain and uses the resulting numbers to rank such pairs. When we say
‘each coalition’ we mean each coalition in a predestined set of possible coalitions, since
in most settings it is natural to assume that not every coalition can form. We look for
ecient (Pareto undominated) pairs of vectors. The associated domination relation can
be formulated also as a property of payo vectors in a certain game. Precise denitions
of the concepts used here are presented in Section 2.
Section 3 is devoted to studying this domination relation for payo vectors in certain
TU games. The connection with the core and the anti-core is established, and undomi-
nated payo vectors are characterized in terms of balanced sets of coalitions. The results
in this section are originally motivated by the analysis of ecient contracts under uncer-
tainty, but they are of independent interest as well.
In Section 4 we consider values|solutions that assign payo vectors to TU games that
always yield an ecient pair in a cooperative game under uncertainty. A complete char-
acterization of these solutions is obtained for the case where the set of allowed coalitions
is a minimally balanced collection. This characterization involves monotone paths and,
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thus, a link is established to similar results in the pure bargaining context (Bossert, Nosal
and Sadanand, 1996; Bossert and Peters, 2001a,b). Furthermore, an existence result for
weakly balanced (but not necessarily minimally balanced) collections is proven. As a by-
product, we also obtain existence of undominated allocations in certain games. Moreover,
the results on values can easily be extended to more than two possible states.
We conclude, in Section 5, by briefly discussing a stronger version of the undominat-
edness property and a related open question.
2 Preliminaries
Throughout, N = f1; : : : ; ng is the set of players. Our convention for vector inequalities
is the following. For x; y 2 IRN , x  y if xi  yi for all i 2 N , and x > y if xi > yi for all
i 2 N .
A transferable utility game (TU game) is a pair (B; v), where B is a nonempty set
of nonempty strict subsets of N , and v:B [ fNg ! IR is a mapping assigning to each
coalition S 2 B [ fNg its worth v(S). Let GB denote the set of all such TU games. If no
confusion is likely we write v instead of (B; v) and G instead of GB. It is understood that
whenever we talk about coalitions we mean elements of B[fNg, unless stated otherwise.
For every v 2 G denote by F (v) the set F (v) := fx 2 IRN : x(N) = v(N)g, where
we adopt the notation x(S) =
P
i2S xi for every coalition S. Vectors in IRN are called
allocations, and vectors in F (v) are called ecient allocations.1
A set B  B is balanced if it is either empty or there are positive numbers S (S 2 B)
with
P
S2B:i2S S = 1 for every i 2 N . The set B is minimally balanced if it is balanced
and contains no balanced subset other than the empty set and B itself. A set of coalitions
B  B is said to be weakly balanced if it contains a nonempty balanced subset.
For a subset S  N , the indicator vector eS is dened by eSi = 1 if i 2 S and eSi = 0
if i =2 S.
Our notion of dominance is dened as follows.
Denition 1 For w;w0 2 G and q; z 2 F (w), q0; z0 2 F (w0) we say that the pair (q; q0)
dominates the pair (z; z0) if for every S 2 B we have
minfq(S)− w(S); q0(S)−w0(S)g > minfz(S)−w(S); z0(S)−w0(S)g:
If there is no pair (q; q0) dominating (z; z0) then the latter pair is called undominated in
(w;w0). <
1In the literature, ecient allocations are also called ‘preimputations.’
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The above denition of dominance can be generalized by considering an arbitrary num-
ber of possible states when applying the maximin criterion to games under uncertainty.
We return to this issue in Section 4, where we demonstrate that, for the purposes of
nding domination ecient values, the above formulation in terms of two possible states
does not involve any loss of generality.
The purpose of this paper is to identify undominated pairs for pairs of games (w;w0) 2
G  G. The interpretation is as follows. Suppose that it is uncertain whether the true
game will be w or w0. A pair (z; z0) with z 2 F (w), z0 2 F (w0), can be seen as a
contingent contract among the players written before the uncertainty is resolved. Let B
be the relevant set of coalitions, that is, the coalitions that would have the power to upset
the contract. We exclude N since by eciency the payo to N is xed. If these coalitions
wish to be on the safe side or, alternatively, are pessimistic in the sense of being worst-case
maximizers, then undominatedness of the pair (z; z0) means that there is no contract that
is better for all coalitions, evaluated in terms of the gains over the coalitional worths.2
Alternatively, one could demand that there is no contract that is at least as good for all
coalitions and strictly better for at least one coalition. This possibility is discussed in
Section 5.
Before proceeding with a closer examination of the domination relation in Denition
1, we adopt the notational convention to consider a vector x 2 IRN simultaneously as
an additive game, where coalition S 2 B [ fNg has worth x(S). Further, comparisons
of games should be considered coalition-wise: for a subset B of coalitions, v  w on B
means v(S)  w(S) for every S 2 B, and v < w on B means v(S) < w(S) for all S 2 B.
The minimum of two games, minfv; wg, on B is the game in which each coalition S 2 B
has worth minfv(S); w(S)g. Finally, a sidepayment is a vector y 2 IRN with y(N) = 0.
Note that the pair (z; z0) is undominated in (w;w0) 2 G  G if, and only if, for all
q 2 F (w), q0 2 F (w0),
minfq − w; q0 − w0g  minfz −w; z0 − w0g ) minfq − w; q0 − w0g 6> minfz − w; z0 −w0g
on B. In other words, if there is a weak inequality on B, there should be at least one
coalition S for which equality holds. Letting v = w−w0, x = z− z0, and writing y = q− z
and y0 = q0 − z0, this is equivalent to the following statement. For all sidepayments y; y0,
minfx+ y; v + y0g  minfx; vg ) minfx+ y; v + y0g 6> minfx; vg on B: (1)
Thus, we have established that for games v; w; w0 2 G with v = w − w0 and x 2 F (v),
z 2 F (w), z0 2 F (w0) with x = z−z0, the pair (z; z0) is undominated in (w;w0) if, and only
2These gains are also referred to as ‘excesses’ in some contributions.
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if, (1) holds for all sidepayments y; y0. This property of x is formalized in the following
denition.
Denition 2 For v 2 G and x 2 F (v), we call x undominated in v if (1) holds for all
sidepayments y; y0. <
Thus, an ecient allocation x in a game v is undominated if it is impossible to redistribute
x and at the same time make sidepayments between coalitions in such a way that all
coalitions in B are better o when evaluated in terms of the minimum of their payos and
their coalitional worths.
3 Undominated Allocations
In this section the focus is on undominated allocations in a game. Naturally, the results
have direct implications for undominated pairs in an uncertain cooperative game.
3.1 Characterization of Undominated Allocations
In order to characterize undominated payo vectors in a TU game, we begin by stating
some preliminary results.
The following lemma is a variation on a result of Derks and Peters (1998) and Zumsteg
(1995), and gives an important relation between sidepayments and balanced sets. Its proof
is based on Farkas’ Lemma.
Lemma 1 Let ; 6= B  B0  B. Then the following two statements are equivalent.
(a) For every sidepayment y 2 IRN with y(S)  0 for all S 2 B0 there is an S^ 2 B with
y(S^) = 0.
(b) B0 contains a balanced subset C with C \B 6= ;.
Proof. Assume that (a) holds and let y and S^ be as in (a). Hence y eN  0, y −eN  0,
y  eS  0 for all S 2 B0, and y  −eS^  0. Then Farkas’ Lemma implies that −eS^ is a
nonnegative weighted sum of the indicator vectors of the
coalitions in B0, eN , and −eN . Therefore,
−eS^ = NeN − NeN +
X
T2B0
T e
T
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with N ; N ; T (T 2 B0) nonnegative. Observe that N < N and therefore there exist
weights γT (T 2 B0) with γS^ > 0 such that
eN =
X
T2B0
γT e
T :
Dene C := fT 2 B0 : γT > 0g. Then C is balanced and contains S^, hence C \ B 6= ;.
This proves (b).
For the converse, let C as in (b) and y a sidepayment with y(S)  0 for all S 2 B0.
Let S > 0 (S 2 C) be balancing weights. Then
0 = y  eN = y 
 X
S2C
Se
S
!
=
X
S2C
Sy(S);
hence y(S) = 0 for all S 2 C. This holds in particular for all S 2 C \ B. 2
By taking B = C in (b) of Lemma 1 the following corollary is immediate.
Corollary 1 If B0 is weakly balanced then for every sidepayment y with y  0 on B0
there is an S 2 B0 with y(S) = 0.
For an ecient allocation x and a game v we denote by H(x; v) the set of coalitions S
that strictly prefer x over their worth in v, that is, x(S) > v(S). Further, E(x; v) denotes
the set of coalitions, other than N , which are indierent between x and v, and L(x; v)
denotes the set of coalitions that are worse o with x. The sets HE(x; v) and LE(x; v)
denote the unions of H(x; v) and L(x; v) with E(x; v), respectively. Note that all these
sets are subsets of B, that is, they do not include N .
We are now suciently equipped to characterize undominated allocations. Let the
allocation x in the game v be ecient, that is, x 2 F (v). Suppose x is undominated.
Then, by (1), for all sidepayments y,
minfx+ y; vg  minfx; vg ) minfx+ y; vg 6> minfx; vg on B (2)
and
minfx; v + y0g  minfx; vg ) minfx; v + y0g 6> minfx; vg on B: (3)
The rst implication ensures that it is not possible to redistribute the allocation x such
that all coalitions in B are better o in terms of the minimum of their allocation and
their worth. The second implication shows that an undominated allocation is robust with
respect to a ‘sidepayment’ perturbation of the game.
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Lemma 2 Let v 2 G and x 2 F (v). Then the following statements are equivalent.
(a) x satises (2).
(b) Either HE(x; v) 6= ; or [HE(x; v) = ; and L(x; v) is weakly balanced].
Proof. In order to prove the implication (a))(b), suppose that x satises (2) and
HE(x; v) = ;. Then for any sidepayment y with y  0 on B, (2) implies that y(S) = 0 for
some S 2 B = L(x; v). By Lemma 1, B contains a balanced subset intersecting L(x; v).
Since B = L(x; v), L(x; v) is weakly balanced.
For the converse implication, let y be a sidepayment satisfying the premise in (2).
First suppose that HE(x; v) 6= ;. Then there is an S 2 B with x(S)  v(S). So
minfx(S) + y(S); v(S)g  v(S) = minfx(S); v(S)g, so that (2) holds. Next suppose
that HE(x; v) = ; and L(x; v) = B contains a nonempty balanced collection. Then
minfx(S) + y(S); v(S)g  x(S) for all S 2 B, so by Corollary 1 there is an S 2 B with
y(S) = 0, so that also in this case (2) holds. 2
The proof of the following lemma is similar and left to the reader.
Lemma 3 Let v 2 G and x 2 F (v). Then the following statements are equivalent.
(a) x satises (3).
(b) Either LE(x; v) 6= ; or [LE(x; v) = ; and H(x; v) is weakly balanced].
In order to characterize undominated allocations, that is, allocations satisfying (1), we
need more than the conjunction of conditions (b) in Lemmas 2 and 3. In particular, we
obtain
Theorem 1 An ecient allocation x is undominated in the game v if, and only if,
HE(x; v) is weakly balanced or LE(x; v) is weakly balanced.
Proof. Let x be an ecient allocation in the game v satisfying (1). Then x also satises
(2) and (3), and by Lemmas 2 and 3 the only-if direction is proved if HE(x; v) or LE(x; v)
are empty. Suppose therefore that these sets both are nonempty. Also suppose, contrary
to what we wish to prove, that neither of them is weakly balanced. Hence by Corollary 1
applied to LE(x; v) there is a sidepayment that is positive on LE(x; v). By multiplying
this sidepayment with a suciently small positive number we obtain a sidepayment y^
with y^(S) > 0 for all S 2 LE(x; v) and such that x(S) + y^(S) > v(S) for all S 2 H(x; v).
Similarly, we can construct a sidepayment ~y with ~y(S) > 0 for all S 2 HE(x; v) and with
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v(S) + ~y(S) > x(S) for all S 2 L(x; v). Thus, on HE(x; v), we have minfx; vg = v <
minfx + y^; v + ~yg, and on LE(x; v), we have minfx; vg = x < minfx + y^; v + ~yg. This
contradicts (1) and completes the proof of the only-if part.
For the if-part, let y and y0 be sidepayments satisfying the premise of (1), and suppose
that HE(x; v) is weakly balanced or LE(x; v) is weakly balanced. If LE(x; v) = ; then
y0(S)  0 for all S 2 B = H(x; v), so weak balancedness of H(x; v) and Corollary 1 imply
y0(S) = 0 for some S 2 B. Thus, (1) holds. A similar argument holds for the case where
HE(x; v) = ;. If both LE(x; v) and HE(x; v) are nonempty, then y  0 on LE(x; v)
and y0  0 on HE(x; v). Since at least one of these sets is weakly balanced, Corollary 1
implies again (1). 2
An important consequence of Theorem 1 is the following corollary.
Corollary 2 If v has undominated allocations, then B is weakly balanced.
It will turn out later that the converse of this corollary also holds; see Theorem 5 in
Section 4. Moreover, Corollary 2 implies that for an uncertain cooperative game to have
an undominated pair, the set of coalitions B must be weakly balanced.
3.2 Stability and Domination
As is well known since the work of Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967), balancedness
is closely related to the existence of the core and the anticore of a game. An ecient
allocation x is in the [anti]core of the game v if x(S)  []v(S) for all S 2 B. A game v is
called [anti]balanced if v(N)  []PS2B Sv(S) for every balanced set B with balancing
weights S, S 2 B. The theorem of Bondareva and Shapley was rst formulated for the
case of games restricted to a balanced collection B, by Faigle (1989). It states that a game
has a nonempty [anti]core if, and only if, it is [anti]balanced. It follows, in particular,
that if B is minimally balanced, then every game v has a nonempty core or a nonempty
anticore.
Denition 3 An allocation x in a game v is stable if it is in the core or in the anticore
of v. <
The relation between stability and domination is straightforward.
Theorem 2 Suppose that B is weakly balanced. Then any stable allocation x in a game
v is undominated.
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Proof. If x is stable in v, then B = HE(x; v) or B = LE(x; v). By weak balancedness of
B and Theorem 1, x is undominated. 2
It easy to construct an example of an undominated allocation in a game v that is not
stable, although the game v does have stable allocations. For example, let N = f1; 2; 3g,
B = ff1g; f2g; f2; 3gg, v(f1g) = 0, v(f2g) = 2, v(f2; 3g) = 0, and v(N) = 4. Then
B is weakly balanced and v has a nonempty core. The ecient allocation (0; 1; 3) is
undominated by Theorem 1 but it is not in the core.
4 Values
In this section we consider uncertain cooperative games, that is, pairs (w;w0) 2 GG, and
we investigate the following question. Can we nd a value, that is, a mapping ’:G ! IRN
with ’(v) 2 F (v), such that (’(w); ’(w0)) is an undominated pair for every uncertain
cooperative game (w;w0) 2 G  G? A value with this property will be called domination
ecient.
4.1 Minimally Balanced Collections
We begin by analyzing the case of a minimally balanced collection. It turns out that, in
this setting, we can characterize all domination ecient values. Throughout this subsec-
tion, B is a minimally balanced set, say B = fS1; : : : ; Skg, with weight set (Sj )j=1:::;k.
That these weights are unique is a well known fact, rst proved by Shapley (1967).
Recall from Section 2 that a pair (z; z0) in F (w)F (w0) is undominated in (w;w0) if,
and only if, z − z0 is undominated in w − w0. Since B is minimally balanced, Theorem
1 implies that either L(z − z0; w − w0) = ; or H(z − z0; w − w0) = ;. In the rst case,
z − w  z0 − w0 and in the second case, z − w  z0 − w0 on B. We have just proved the
following lemma.
Lemma 4 Let B be minimally balanced, and let ’ be a domination ecient value. Then,
for all w;w0 2 G,
’(w)(S)− w(S)  ’(w0)(S)− w0(S) for all S 2 B
or
’(w)(S)− w(S)  ’(w0)(S)− w0(S) for all S 2 B:
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A set P  IRk is a monotone path if for every t 2 IR there is a unique point p 2 P
with
Pk
i=1 pi = t and for all p; p
0 2 P it holds that p  p0 or p  p0.
A monotone B-path is a monotone path P  IRk satisfying, moreover, that for every
p 2 P there is an x 2 IRN such that, for every j = 1; : : : ; k, we have x(Sj) = pj=Sj .
We say that a value ’ is associated with the monotone B-path P if for every game v 2 G
there is a p 2 P with ’(v)(Sj) − v(Sj) = pj=Sj for every j = 1; : : : ; k and ’(v) 2 F (v).
Clearly, since the indicator vectors corresponding to a minimally balanced collection form
a linearly independent system, any monotone path P  IRk is a monotone B-path for a
minimally balanced collection of size k.
We now obtain
Theorem 3 Let B be minimally balanced, let P 2 IRk be a monotone B-path, and let ’
be an associated value. Then ’ is domination ecient.
Proof. Consider two arbitrary games w;w0 2 G and dene z = ’(w) and z0 = ’(w0). It
is sucient to prove that (z; z0) is an undominated pair. Take x 2 F (w) and x0 2 F (w0)
and suppose that for every S 2 B we have
minfx(S)− w(S); x0(S)− w0(S)g  minfz(S)− w(S); z0(S)− w0(S)g:
It is sucient to prove that not all these inequalities are strict; in fact, we can demonstrate
that all of them are actually equalities. Let p; p0 2 P
correspond to z; z0 so that z(Sj) − w(Sj) = pj=Sj and z0(Sj) − w0(Sj) = p0j=Sj for
every j = 1; : : : ; k. Without loss of generality, suppose p0  p. Then
minfx(S)− w(S); x0(S)− w0(S)g  z(S)− w(S)
for all S 2 B. This implies x(S)  z(S) for all S 2 B and hence
w(N) = x(N) =
X
i2N
X
S2B:i2S
Sxi =
X
S2B
Sx(S) 
X
S2B
Sz(S) = z(N) = w(N);
hence all inequalities are equalities. 2
The following converse of Theorem 3 completes the characterization of domination
ecient values for the minimally balanced case.
Theorem 4 Let B be minimally balanced, and let ’ be a domination ecient value. Then
there exists a monotone B-path P to which ’ is associated.
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Proof. For every t 2 IR dene the game vt 2 G by vt(N) = t and vt(S) = 0 for every
S 2 B, and dene the vector pt 2 IRk by ptj = Sj’(vt)(Sj) for every j = 1; : : : ; k. Then
kX
j=1
ptj =
kX
j=1
Sj’(v
t)(Sj) = ’(v
t)(N) = t
for every t 2 IR. Moreover, by Lemma 4, pt  ps whenever t  s. Hence P := fpt : t 2 IRg
is a monotone B-path.
It suces to show that ’ is associated with this path. To this end, let v be an arbitrary
game. Lemma 4 implies that for every t 2 IR it holds that
’(v)(Sj)− v(Sj)  ’(vt)(Sj)− vt(Sj) for all j = 1; 2; : : : ; k
or
’(v)(Sj)− v(Sj)  ’(vt)(Sj)− vt(Sj) for all j = 1; 2; : : : ; k;
that is, that
’(v)(Sj)− v(Sj)  ptj=Sj for all j = 1; 2; : : : ; k
or
’(v)(Sj)− v(Sj)  ptj=Sj for all j = 1; 2; : : : ; k:
Because P is a monotone path it follows that ’(v)(Sj)− v(Sj) = pj=Sj for some p 2 P .
Moreover, ’(v) 2 F (v) by denition. Hence, ’ is associated with P . 2
It should be noted that, if the set of indicator vectors is smaller than n, a monotone
B-path does not uniquely determine an associated value, since the involved systems of
linear equations does not have a unique solution. For instance, let N = f1; 2; 3g and let
B = ff1g; f2; 3gg. Then, in a monotone B-path P with an associated value ’, only the
sum ’2(v) +’3(v) is determined through P , but not the separate values for players 2 and
3.
4.2 Existence
As long as the weakly balanced set B determines a linearly independent set of charac-
teristic vectors, monotone B-paths with associated values can be constructed as in the
preceding subsection. These associated values are again domination ecient. For exam-
ple, suppose N = f1; : : : ; 4g and let
B = ff1; 2g; f3; 4g; f1; 3g; f2; 4gg:
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This set is not minimally balanced, but the construction used in the proof of Theorem
4 is still possible. It is not clear what a complete characterization of all domination
ecient values would look like without the minimal-balancedness assumption. We can,
however, completely settle the existence question regarding domination ecient values.
Observe that it is easy to construct undominated allocations from a domination ecient
value. Hence, from the remark following Corollary 2, we already know that B has to be
weakly balanced in order to ensure that a domination ecient value exists. The following
theorem demonstrates that weak balancedness is also sucient for existence. Additionally,
this implies the existence of undominated allocations in certain games.
Theorem 5 If B is weakly balanced, there exists a domination ecient value.
Proof. Because B is weakly balanced, there exists a nonempty minimally balanced sub-
collection C  B. Dene a monotone C-path as in the previous subsection and let ’ be a
value associated with this path. This implies that we have
’(v)(S)− v(S)  ’(w)(S)−w(S) for all S 2 C
or
’(v)(S)− v(S)  ’(w)(S)− w(S) for all S 2 C:
This implies that, for all v; w 2 G, there do not exist x 2 F (v) and y 2 F (w) such that
minfx(S)− v(S); y(S)−w(S)g > minf’(v)(S)− v(S); ’(w)(S)− w(S)g (4)
for all S 2 C. Because C  B, this immediately implies that there do not exist x 2 F (v)
and y 2 F (w) such that (4) holds for all S 2 B. Therefore, ’ is domination ecient. 2
4.3 More Than Two States
As mentioned in Section 2, the denition of a domination ecient value can be modied
by employing an alternative notion of dominance that is not restricted to two states.
Specically, we could require the following.
Denition 4 For m  2, w1; : : : ; wm 2 G, and qj; zj 2 F (wj) (j = 1; : : : ;m), we say
that the m-tuple (q1; : : : ; qm) generalized dominates the m-tuple (z1; : : : ; zm) if for every
S 2 B we have
minfqj(S)−wj(S) : j = 1; : : : ;mg > minfzj(S)−wj(S) : j = 1; : : : ;mg:
If there is no m-tuple (q1; : : : ; qm) generalized dominating (z1; : : : ; zm) then the latter
m-tuple is called generalized undominated in (w1; : : : ; wm). <
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Accordingly, a generalized domination ecient value can be dened. Clearly, a generalized
domination ecient value is a domination ecient value. Furthermore, because the values
of Theorems 3 and 5 satisfy this stronger notion of domination eciency, all results of
this section can be generalized by allowing for an arbitrary number of possible states.
Therefore, we obtain the following corollaries to Theorems 3 to 5.
Corollary 3 If B is weakly balanced, there exists a generalized domination ecient value.
Corollary 4 Let B be minimally balanced, and let ’ be a generalized domination ecient
value. Then there exists a monotone B-path P to which ’ is associated.
Corollary 5 Let B be minimally balanced, let P 2 IRk be a monotone B-path, and let ’
be an associated value. Then ’ is generalized domination ecient.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper provides an analysis of domination eciency dened for TU games. A related
question is what happens if our notion of domination is modied by requiring weak in-
equalities with at least one strict inequality instead of the strict inequalities in Denition
1. Many of the results in this paper can be modied quite easily to apply to this alter-
native framework of strongly undominated allocations and strong domination eciency
as well. In particular, an analogue of Theorem 1 can be established, and an equiva-
lence rather than an implication regarding stable allocations and strongly undominated
allocations can be derived. Furthermore, the characterization of values associated with
monotone B-paths remains to be valid in the case of minimally balanced collections. The
most important dierence is that the existence issue is an open problem. Balancedness
of B is necessary for the existence of strongly domination ecient values but it is not
sucient. This alternative model and its properties is an issue to be explored in future
work.
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